Adversaries are running coordinated campaigns to control critical mineral supply chains, while the US is still talking about action instead of taking it. China and Russia are executing synchronized, long-term strategies to control access, processing, and export leverage over materials that are essential to defense and advanced technology. China’s export controls on gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials are meant to pressure the U.S. and its allies. Though currently dependent on China, Russia is building refining capacity and aligning with China’s strategy. U.S. efforts remain split across agencies and disconnected from industry, despite major investments.
China’s overseas investments reinforce that leverage. China holds stakes in 80 million tons of lithium resources that extend control across the global supply chain. China’s export restrictions follow the same pattern. Their 2023 controls on gallium and germanium, along with the 2024 ban targeting U.S. access to antimony and superhard materials were predictable steps in their campaign to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities, especially our import reliance on gallium.
China’s Critical Minerals Position
| China’s Control | Value |
| Share of raw gallium produced by China | 98% |
| Share of global gallium supply China controls | 90% |
| Share of global germanium output China controls | 60% |
| Share of global rare earth refining capacity China holds | 90% |
| Overseas lithium carbonate equivalent under Chinese stakes | 80 million tons |
| Chinese share in major lithium projects | ≥20% in 14 projects across 8 countries |
| Materials restricted | Gallium, Germanium |
| Materials targeted | Antimony, Superhard materials |
Russia adds pressure through its own effort to reduce dependency and build leverage. It currently imports 90% of its rare earth elements from China and is investing $9.2 billion in a Siberian processing hub and aims to increase domestic rare earth production to 3,000 tons annually by 2030, targeting 10% of global supply. By expanding its own capacity and aligning with China’s export controls, it helps form a coordinated challenge to Western industry and defense. They’re moving in sync, while the U.S. remains reactive and divided.
The U.S. lacks an integrated campaign structure to link policy, investment, and industry. Since 2020, the DoW has invested hundreds of millions to rebuild domestic rare earth supply chains. This is an important but narrow step within a much larger system.
The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan raises concerns about economic coercion and supports standards-based markets, but statements alone do not create strategy. Without coordination across diplomacy, defense, and domestic industry, U.S. initiatives remain isolated efforts rather than a resilient, coherent plan.
To counter this, the U.S. can apply insight gained from TTI’s Opportunity Analysis (OA) to build an operational framework that treats supply chains as contested domains. OA is built for action. It brings together the distinct strengths, authorities, and access points of U.S. agencies, allies, and partners and turns them into coordinated operations and campaigns. The U.S. must use this coordination to identify and break the pathways adversaries use for leverage. Examples include building or friend‑shoring refining capacity before crises emerge. They also include linking stockpiles to early warning indicators that trigger coordinated action. Another step is encouraging joint ventures among trusted partners and limiting those that give adversaries access to U.S. processing. Finally, the U.S. and its allies can advance alternative materials and technologies that reduce dependence on vulnerable supply chains.
Integrated planning and campaigning is already proven across defense and interagency work. It connects long‑term goals, such as supply chain resilience, with the short‑term actions needed to achieve them. It also aligns efforts across the U.S. interagency, allies, partners, and private industry. Integrated campaigning transforms announcements into action with a steady, coordinated execution. Without it, even well‑funded initiatives can drift, conflict with each other, or fall short of broader strategic goals.
The United States needs a true campaign that brings diplomacy, investment, and industrial policy into a single, harmonious effort. Integrated planning and campaigning can unify stakeholders, disrupt adversary pathways, and strengthen our own. Leverage in critical minerals comes from shaping the system rather than reacting to it. Fragmented responses will not close the gap. The advantage will go to nations that campaign with purpose and force others to respond. This is how the United States puts action behind its declared intentions.
This post is part of an ongoing series on U.S. critical minerals strategy and national security.
